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Summary 
Until now, the extensive literature dealing with competition policy and trade agreements has 
referred mainly to integration agreements or their development at a plurilateral or multilateral 
level. Within this context, this paper aims to explore the impact that the growth of bilateral trade 
agreements —particularly FTAs— has on international cooperation regarding competition 
policies. It also considers whether these agreements are complementary to plurilateral and 
multilateral efforts to establish international coordination and cooperation on competition. These 
issues are inseparable given the generalized and growing economic openness and the changes in 
producer organizations and their international expansion, which create new competitive 
conditions. 
In a bid to address the above-mentioned issues, Section I presents an overview of the 
trade agreements established within the region since the beginning of the 1990s and highlights the 
interdependence of negotiating processes at various levels. It then examines competition policy in 
free trade agreements and other cooperation mechanisms. Section II, which contains the central 
issue of this paper, considers competition policy in bilateral free trade agreements in the region, 
and identifies the most common approaches or models. Lastly, Section III presents a 
recapitulation of these experiences and suggest evaluate their potential costs and benefits for 
countries in the region. 
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I. Introduction 
Under the new multilateral system (the World Trade Organization (WTO), which emerged from 
the Uruguay Round), the countries of the region launched trade agreements of various levels  
—bilateral, sub-regional and plurilateral— in the 1990s. These initiatives came as a complement 
to unilateral liberalization since the mid 1980s.1 At an initial stage, countries took part in intra-
regional agreements, Economic Complementation Agreement ECA/Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA), and from the mid-1990s they began signing FTAs, which were much more 
ambitious than the former and in which non-regional partners also took part. Presently, there are 
close to 40 trade agreements in the region, and over half of those are FTAs. Chile and Mexico can 
attest to this experience, being two important poles in a growing network of bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements (“spaghetti bowl”). 
FTAs include more precise norms than their predecessors in regard to trade in goods, and 
further liberalization in regard to services and investment. Likewise, these agreements give great 
importance to establishing rules on more general issues related to, or affecting, trade, such as 
intellectual property, technical standards, government procurement or competition policy. Thus, 
FTAs become commitments that are “WTO plus” and include more precise mechanisms 
regarding dispute settlement, however, they do not include instruments that relate to the 
asymmetric conditions of the countries involved. 
The emergence of bilateral agreements coincides with steps taken by sub-regional 
agreements —Andean Community (CAN), MERCOSUR, Central American Common Market 
(CACM), and CARICOM— to widen gradually their integration schemes. Likewise, with an 
important demand in negotiating efforts, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) process 
has been a learning process for some countries in the region and, to some extent, has helped to 
channel recent bilateral agreements. Two recent phenomena, the strengthening of South-South 
relations and the scope of integrated trade and cooperation (e.g. through the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA)), seem to establish a re-routing of the international integration 
strategy for developing countries.2 
                                                     
1
 ECLAC, 1994, 1995 and 2004; Devlin and Ffrench-Davis, 1999. 
2
 UNCTAD, 2004; Kuwayama, 2004; Gutiérrez, 2003 and Aoki, 2004. 
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Trade liberalization and the strengthening of integration among countries through trade 
agreements define conditions for competition that are much more demanding on their economies 
and on markets in which they interact. Nevertheless, the benefits of trade liberalization can be 
undermined by anticompetitive practices that affect the local economy. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows and liberalization processes, together with the trend towards concentration and the 
intensification of transborder economic activity, place greater demands on competition policy.3  
Therefore, a greater level of international cooperation is needed for the establishment and 
application of rules in this area. 
Thus, it is easy to understand why Mexico and Chile, which are the countries of the 
region most actively engaged in international integration strategies, are also the most active in 
competition policy cooperation. These nations are also among those with an extensive history of 
competition policy. Therefore, the attention given to this issue during the last decade has gone 
hand in hand with the proliferation and strengthening of trade agreements in the region, which is 
a phenomenon that is also observed at an international level. 
At the multilateral level there is no comprehensive set of rules governing competition 
policy, hence the growing tendency to incorporate provisions on this issue in bilateral, sub-
regional, and hemispheric negotiations and agreements which constitute WTO-plus disciplines.4 
The Cancun Conference of September 2003 did not reach the needed consensus in terms of the 
work programme set out in Doha to launch the beginning of negotiations on this issue (OMC, 
2001a and 2003). 
One of the main difficulties in the construction of international regulations is the fact that 
competition policies have been relatively scarce in developing countries. Those that exist are of 
recent development. Indeed, in 1990, only five nations in this region had competition laws. At 
present, 12 of the 33 countries of the region possess such laws, while eight —not including 
Caribbean nations— are at the drafting stage and a greater number have sectoral and 
constitutional laws or other relevant provisions (see FTAA, 2002a).5 Likewise, those countries 
with previously existing legislation introduced reforms in their regulatory and competition setups 
around the year 2000. Thus, there was a generalized need to establish policies in this area within 
the framework of reforms applied by these countries during the last decade, especially those 
designed to liberalize their economies. 
A. Cooperation on Competition Policy and Regional Trade 
Agreements 
The strengthening of integration schemes geared to the creation of common markets has 
highlighted the urgent need in the late 1990s, to formulate and develop competition systems. The 
only regulations that exist are those under MERCOSUR-1996, CAN-1991 and CARICOM-1997,6 
                                                     
3
 The main concerns are the increase in mergers and acquisitions and the presence of international cartels 
for goods of interest for developing countries. See WTO 1997; UNCTAD, 1999; OECD, 2001. 
4
 Specific or sectoral WTO agreements contain only a few provisions regarding competition, especially in 
services, antidumping, subsidies and intellectual property. The development of global multilateral rules 
has been the subject of debate since the Singapore Conference, 1996. 
5
 For analysis and systematization in this regard, refer to Moguillansky and Silva, 2004; Celani and 
Stanley, 2003. 
6
 For further information on competition policy under these agreement and under NAFTA, see Tavares y 
Tineo, 1999; Tavares and others, 2001; UNCTAD, 2003; and FTAA, 2002 b and 2003 a. In CACM, 
there is no regional competition system or institution, even though provisions of the Guatemala Protocol 
1993 (ex article 25) and later resolutions refer to the need to promote a free competition mechanism at a 
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under different schemes geared to policy harmonization, supra-national rules or cooperation 
among national authorities. The level of application and implementation of the rules of these 
agreements has been low. 
Another model that considers a competition policy without a supra-national character 
oriented towards achieving the goals of the free trade area is the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) (1992). This agreement centres its attention on carrying out national laws, cooperation 
among authorities and the convergence of laws. The level of cooperation foreseen is less intense 
than that of other extra-regional experiences; however, there are relevant arrangements regarding 
transparency, monopolies and State enterprises; likewise, there is greater emphasis on reducing 
uncertainties for investment. 
It is important to point out that work on competition in the aforementioned trading blocs 
has helped to strengthen the relevant institutions in some of the member countries; and the 
regional rules eventually enable to afford situations that involve countries that do not have 
independent rules regarding competition.  
At the hemispheric level, it should be noted that a chapter on competition policy (with a 
number of pending options) has been included in the FTAA negotiation process, which started in 
1998 (FTAA, 2003 b). This chapter addresses concerns that are also present at WTO, such as 
basic principles and cooperation mechanisms; in a number of articles, significant changes have 
been made to take into account substantive issues as well as procedures with respect to this 
policy. The institutional and legislative challenges are important within this framework, since a 
number of countries do not have laws on competition; however, this challenge will also depend 
on the basic common “floor” set up within the new architecture of the FTAA announced in 
Miami in 2003. 
The FTAA process has feedback with the work done in other plurilateral (APEC and 
OECD) and multilateral (WTO, UNCTAD, ICN) forums, through analysis and debates in which 
countries are participating more and more actively. Moreover, it should be made clear that while 
WTO and FTAA lead to binding agreements for participating countries, in other forums, the aim 
is to establish principles, guidelines or recommendations to which those nations could adhere on a 
voluntary basis (OECD, 2002; UNCTAD, 2003; Vautier, 2002). 
The countries of the region, which have signed bilateral FTAs since the mid-1990s, most 
of which include competition policy components —have renewed their interest in such policies. 
They stand to benefit from the fact that most of these agreements have been established with 
countries with a higher level of development and which have a long history, hence knowledge 
and experience, of competition systems. Likewise, this phenomenon, which is dealt with in detail 
in the next section, underscores the urgency for institution building in these countries.  
A number of the agreements mentioned also include international cooperation on 
competition, designed to counter anti-competitive practices, both domestically and 
internationally, within the context of liberalization and integration. They all provide for a general 
exchange of information and experiences, as well as conceptual discussions. However, more 
ambitious agreements deal with substantive rules and cooperation mechanisms, even though the 
majority aim to strengthen already existing laws. 
                                                                                                                                                              
national and regional level (SIECA, 2000). At the last meeting of the MERCOSUR-CMC, July 7-8 
2004, a cooperation understanding was reached among competition authorities. 
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Another sort of cooperation applies to the resolution of actual cases, or to laws, where 
there is a commitment by the competition authorities from the countries of a bilateral agreement.7 
In the region there are nine agreements of this kind, some of which are related with, or derived 
from an FTA-type commercial agreement (table 1). 
Mexican and Chilean agreements, unlike those signed by Brazil, have established 
cooperation for the application of competition laws as a complement to the FTA signed with one 
of its partners. In other words, the cooperation component, which is set out in a very preliminary 
manner in these agreements, is actually developed. One of the main results of the formal 
agreements has been to stimulate informal cooperation, which is systematic and widespread, with 
discussion of approaches and sharing of information on cases with common elements.8 
 
TABLE 1  
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAWS 
Country  Counterpart Year of 
signing 
PRECEEDING Main aspectsa 
Brazil USA 1999  Notification, positive courtesy 
 Portugal*  1999  Few descriptions of activities 
 Russia 2001 * S/i 
 Argentina  2003 MERCOSUR, 
1991 
Notification, exchange of information and aspects of 
positive and negative comity 
Mexicob  USA 2000 NAFTA, 1992 Notification, coordination of similar issues, positive 
and negative comity, Cooperation in application 
 Canada 2001 NAFTA, 1992 Similar to Mexico-USA 
 Chile  2004 FTA 1998 Similar to previous Mexican agreements 
Chile Canada** 2001 FTA, 1996 Notification, prevention of conflicts and 
confidentiality 
 Costa Rica** 2003 FTA with 
CACM, 1999 
Exchange of information and collaboration. (There 
will be annexes with specific instruments) 
Source: Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Inventario de los acuerdos, tratados y otros arreglos sobre políticas 
de competencia existentes en el hemisferio occidental (FTAA.ngpc/inf/03/Rev.2), 22 March 2002; official web sites of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Federal Commission of Competition CFC-
Mexico, CB-Canada, Fiscalía Nacional Económica de Chile (FNE); Claudio Considera and Cleveland Teixeira, 
“Brazil’s Recent Experience in International Cooperation” [on line] Artigos 
<http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portaldaconcorrencia/>, 2002.  
*Protocol; **Memorandum of understanding 
a The more emphasized aspects are presented from each respective agreement. 
b Negotiations are also underway with Brazil and the country is participating in a working group on this issue in FTA 
negotiations with Japan, also with Argentina and Uruguay (OECD, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, chapters dealing with competition in trade agreements tend to contain 
more substantive rules rather than rules of procedure for cooperation owing to their objectives of 
                                                     
7
 This has been a voluntary instrument, which, until now, has been used basically by developed 
economies. It is a form of cooperation which relies on instruments such as exchange of information, 
request for investigation or notification and consultations regarding actions that could affect parties, 
exchange of professionals and coordination during investigation of anticompetitive practices, assistance 
and exchange of information, among others (WTO, 1997, 2002; OECD, 2002; UNCTAD, 2003). 
8
 Evaluation of the United States–Brazil experience can be found in: Considera and Teixeira, 2002; and 
in Tavares, M. 2002; and information on Mexico-United States cooperation in FTAA, 2003a. 
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market integration (UNCTAD, 2003). In terms of regional experience, the content of FTA 
chapters dealing with competition is quite diverse as regards scope, approaches and agreed 
commitments, as will be seen in the following section. 
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II. Competition Policy in Bilateral Trade 
Agreements 
A. General Issues 
The analysis of competition conditions and policy in bilateral agreements —FTAs— must go 
beyond the chapter on competition in order to reflect fully the importance attached by countries to 
these issues in trade agreements. The scope of this analysis will be more limited in view of the 
interdependent and cross-cutting character of competition policy, which is set out in a series of 
reforms in coordination with other national policies and regulations.9 However, the chapters 
address in a comprehensive manner participating countries’ concerns that some anti-competitive 
practices might hinder the effects of liberalization and make economic functions less efficient. 
Likewise, these chapters seek to ensure —through mutual commitments and cooperation— that 
national policies deal with these objectives and develop enforcement mechanisms. 
Certain provisions of the agreements are not addressed in this paper.10 11 Among them, 
the treatment of unfair practices in international trade, regulatory issues, service provisions, 
especially telecommunications, and intellectual property rights. Likewise, agreements limited to 
specific entities or those put forward with the sole intention of developing competition provisions 
are not considered. For example, the chapter on state trading enterprises of the trilateral 
agreement, G3, is not taken into account. The ECA signed on December 2003 by MERCOSUR 
                                                     
9
 The role of “advocacy” set out by competition policy thus has relevance for the creation for pre-
conditions that will allow an efficient functioning of competition and for the coherence with other 
policies (Cernat and Holmes in Brusick and others 2004). 
10
 Unfair practices derived from dumping practices or subsidies are normally dealt within all agreements 
under specific chapters in order to cover practices of firms or governments that hinder competition in 
another country (see Tavares and others, 2001; Schmidt and others, 2002). Some agreements contain 
competition provisions even though there is no specific chapter dedicated to this policy (ex. Mexico-
Nicaragua for telecommunications). 
11
 The WTO TRIPS agreement refers especially to the granting of contractual licenses and the possibility 
that governments adopt measures to avoid anticompetitive practices in the potential abuse of intellectual 
property rights. The Mexico–Costa Rica FTA contains provisions to that end (Article 14-07). 
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and three countries of CAN, contains Title VI regarding restrictive practices on competition, 
whose only objective is to promote actions in the field.12 
Thus, the following will refer to the 18 reciprocal bilateral agreements —basically 
FTAs—, which actually contain a specific chapter on competition policy (see annexes 1 and 2).13 
The term bilateral character is used for agreements with two partners, even if one of them is an 
integration bloc. These agreements involve 26 countries of the region —including 13 from 
CARICOM—, which have participated individually or within integration blocs, in arrangements 
with countries of the region and beyond. Many of these agreements (11) involve countries of the 
region with some developed partner or a very different geographical area, such as: Canada, 
United States, the European Union, EFTA, Israel, and Asian countries such as Japan, Republic of 
Korea and Taiwan Province of China. 
The first agreements were signed in 1996; however, most are more recent with over half 
signed since 2000, and six as recently as 2003. Thus, it is too early to evaluate the benefits that 
may be derived from their implementation. The experience is concentrated basically in two 
countries of the region, Mexico and Chile, which are parties to 13 agreements, including a 
bilateral agreement between the two countries in 1998.14 Other countries that have been active in 
terms of provisions referring to competition are Central American, Costa Rica and Panama. 
The participants in these agreements present a mixed picture in terms of level of 
development, size of the economy and development of competition institutions. In many cases 
these agreements involve countries or blocs that do not have rules regarding competition, to the 
extent of having comprehensive laws and institutions dedicated to the defence of competition, as 
is the case in Central America and the Dominican Republic.15 
The chapters analysed also vary significantly in terms of their content with respect to 
motivation, scope, components and levels of commitment, reflecting the varied characteristics of 
the agreement and of the countries taking part. Among them, the outreach of the agreement and 
its commitments, the size, economic structure and level of development of the countries, the 
history and intensity of economic/trade relations among them, and the maturity and proximity of 
the scope in competition institutionality. This diversity makes it much more difficult to make 
comparisons or to establish frameworks that could be interpreted as models for agreements on 
competition issues. Thus, the establishment of categories —or normative issues— corresponds to 
a proposal that steps should be taken to identify models for cooperation agreements. 
B. Characteristics of the Agreements 
For purposes of comparison, the provisions of the 18 selected agreements have been analysed 
under six main headings. These include objectives, principles and institutionality, scope and 
coverage, monopolies and State enterprises, cooperation and coordination, and dispute settlement 
(see annex 3).16 These elements allow exploring the extent of the mutual commitment of countries 
                                                     
12
 The MERCOSUR and Peru ECA, of August 2003, are expressed in these terms; the same applies to 
ECA Nº 36 from 1996, between MERCOSUR and Bolivia. The latter share a common title in referring 
to common unfair trade practices and competition restrictions. 
13
 The Cotonou agreement between the EU and the ACP countries, which includes the Caribbean, has not 
been considered since it is a non-reciprocal setup, which includes competition provisions. 
14
 Does not include the participation of Mexico in NAFTA, since it is a trilateral agreement, which is 
mentioned in the previous chapter of this paper. 
15
 See Hernández and Schatan, 2002. 
16
 Although these headings may not correspond to the titles of articles or sections in every chapter 
analysed, they will give an idea of the diversity and scope of the provisions. 
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regarding competition policy, in terms of improving their provisions and making their application 
procedures more efficient; they also reveal the depth of the desired cooperation on this issue. 
A noticeable gap can de detected in the level of ambition in each agreement, which 
should place at a higher level those agreements between Chile–USA, Costa Rica–Canada and 
Mexico–EU. Other agreements refer to the intention of launching coordinated efforts on the issue, 
as in the case of the Mercosur–Chile agreement, 1996. 
1. Objectives 
An initial examination of the aforementioned agreements reveals two explicit or implicit 
objectives: to ensure that anti-competitive practices do not undermine the benefits of a treaty or 
rather help to further its objectives,17 and to promote cooperation and coordination. The need to 
pursue efficiency and consumer welfare is spelled out only in a handful of cases, for example, 
only the agreement between Chile–Mercosur proposes the establishment of rules for consumer 
protection. 
The specific objective of promoting cooperation and coordination is made explicit in over 
half of the agreements, which also recognize the importance of these functions. Various 
mechanisms have been adopted for their implementation in many agreements. This dimension, 
which will be referred to in greater detail in the section on cooperation (5), can be specially found 
in the agreements between the European blocs —European Union, EFTA— and Asian countries, 
as well as the agreements between Canada and Costa Rica. 
Like integration agreements, bilateral agreements contain substantive rules and not only 
procedures regarding cooperation, as in the case of agreements between agencies. Only a few 
agreements state their purpose of making headway on common provisions, and this applies 
generally to small countries. This suggests that the majority of agreements give priority to the 
intention of maintaining the supremacy of national laws. In those cases oriented to common 
provisions, it is clearly spelled out that the objective is to begin joint efforts, for example, in the 
agreements between Chile-Mercosur, Central America-Panama and Costa Rica-CARICOM.  
There are a few agreements, whose parties do not have any competition provisions, 
which can eventually act as a catalyst for domestic policy.18 Countries or blocs in this situation 
are Dominican Republic, Central American and certain CARICOM countries. 
Lastly, no agreement makes explicit the relationship between competition policy and 
trade remedies —antidumping rules and countervailing duties. This differs from integration 
agreements from outside the region, such as the Australia/New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), which renounces or prohibits the application of such 
measures.19 Only a few (such as the Chile-Mexico agreement) set out the possibility of evaluating 
the relationship between trade and competition laws and policies in the free trade zone, in which 
the treatment of these measures can eventually be dealt with. 
 
                                                     
17
 Strengthening the application of competition policy of the participating parties, especially in the free 
trade area, to avoid distortions that may affect trade, may pursue these objectives. 
18
 An experience to consider in this respect is the Japan-Singapore agreement (JSEPA 2002), reached 
before Singapore had legislation on that issue. The evaluation made by both governments, after the first 
year, indicates that the system of notifications was already in place and that both motivated cooperation 
on competition (refer to MOFA-Japan website). 
19
 See New Zealand (1997). In the cases of Chile-Canada and Chile-EFTA, where it was impossible to use 
antidumping mechanisms, the chapter on competition does not make explicit reference to the subject. 
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2. Principles and Institutionality 
The principles of non-discrimination and transparency are a common feature of many multilateral 
trade agreements. Many issues at the multilateral level, which include judicial actions, also 
incorporate the principle of due process.20 Close to one third of the agreements under analysis, 
generally the more recent ones (Costa Rica-Canada and Chile-USA), explicitly identify one or 
more of these principles. Only three agreements, involving Chile, point out the importance of 
adopting acceptable principles for the Parties at multilateral forums, such as WTO. In terms of 
transparency, some agreements show special concern for the public availability of the measures 
and the rationale for anticompetitive practices. It is argued that agreeing on making those 
principles explicit in competition policy in each country can help to legitimize competition 
policy. 
In terms of specific institutions in the realm of competition policy, there are only a few 
agreements (for example, Costa Rica-Canada and Chile-USA) that establish prerequisites for 
autonomy or impartiality for establishing or maintaining competition authorities. At least one 
third of the agreements provide for the establishment of a body or advisory committee, which 
could either look at ways of implementing the cooperation commitments and capacity building or 
study the relationship between trade and competition policy. Likewise, some envisage the 
possibility of appointing officials to deal with such questions. The efficient application of these 
agreements calls for coordination between the negotiating organisms in each country and those 
responsible, at a technical level, for domestic policy.  
Clearly, the relevant institutions are still in the initial stages of development. The scant 
mention of the possibility of recourse to some sort of dispute settlement mechanism, which will 
be referred subsequently (6), could be signalling something similar. 
3. Scope of Application 
Generally, the agreements analysed contain substantive general rules on anti-competitive 
practices for companies, with marginal reference to government actions, such as State grants.21 In 
this respect, bilateral agreements differ from those established in sub regional blocs or in the 
experience between the European Union and other European countries (facing the recent growth 
of the bloc)(UNCTAD, 2003; WTO, 1997). 
A few agreements clearly identify anti-competitive practices that will receive priority 
attention. Most are described in generic terms. These practices include collusion, abuse of 
dominant position, mergers and acquisitions.22 On the other hand, the majority of agreements that 
do not identify these practices are also the agreements in which the chapter on competition policy 
is centred on, or gives priority to, monopolies and State enterprises. Most of these agreements 
grant exclusion over the regulation of monopolies to government entities that obtain goods or 
                                                     
20
 It is important to point out that all these principles are explored in the discussion on competition 
currently taking place in WTO. Non-discrimination in this framework normally contains two elements: 
national treatment and most favoured nation status (MFN); in which the principle of transparency is 
also included. Due process, for its part, has an important specificity in competition policy in relation to 
the enforcement of the law and related issues, such as the requests for investigation, the application of 
sanctions and the treatment of confidential information (OECD, 2003). 
21
 The Mexico-European Union agreement proposes a more general notification on government measures 
affecting competition. 
22
 The coordinated treatment for hard-core cartels is of great concern at the multilateral level, in view of 
their harmful results and impact on sectors of interest to developing countries (See UNCTAD, 2003; 
OECD, 2003). 
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services for official purposes or on a non-commercial basis. In this respect, only the Costa Rica-
Canada agreement contains transparency and evaluation standards regarding exclusions. 
4. Monopolies and State Enterprises23 
Over half of the agreements under consideration contain rules regarding monopolies and State 
enterprises, under NAFTA approach, and only seven of them contain detailed rules on the 
subject.24 Most of them authorize countries, subject to their laws, to designate monopolies or 
establish State enterprises, and to notify the other Party of the establishment of such entities when 
its interest could be affected. The supervision of such entities is aimed at ensuring that their 
functioning does not hinder the objectives of the agreement, that they act in accordance with trade 
regulations or that they do not use their monopolistic position to carry out anti-competitive 
practices. For some, the supervision should be carried out through rules, administrative 
supervision or other mechanisms, and should not affect public entities for non-commercial 
transactions. 
Some NAFTA-style agreements state that monopolies and State enterprises, when 
engaging in trade actions, must not grant discriminatory treatment to investment or to goods and 
services of another Party. In many cases, it is specified that the restrictions placed on monopolies 
do not limit their ability to set prices in different geographical markets, as long as this 
differentiation is in keeping with normal commercial conditions in those markets. 
The agreements that lay down the most substantial pre-requisites for these entities are 
also those, which include lax provisions regarding cooperation and coordination, placing, in some 
cases, greater emphasis on the application of national legislation. Many of them also provide for 
dispute settlement on the basis of clauses regarding rules on monopolies and State enterprises. It 
should be pointed out that many of these agreements also contain rules on monopolies in other 
sections of the agreement, such as services and more specifically, telecommunications. 
5. Cooperation and Coordination 
The agreements analysed vary considerably in terms of the detail or level of commitment in the 
area of cooperation and coordination for the application of competition policy and legislation. 
The main elements are: (i) notification of the activities on the application of laws; (ii) exchange of 
information to facilitate the effective application; (iii) consultations —and prevention of 
conflicts— when the important interests of a country are affected in another territory; and 
(iv) mutual technical cooperation. To a lesser extent, specific cases of coordination for the 
application of the law can be found. 
Almost all agreements contain references to the notification of application activities, if 
they could affect the interest of their partners, if it is related to its application duties or if it 
concerns the designation of a monopoly or State enterprise. Normally, agreements recommend 
notification with a certain level of detail and in the initial stages of the process or situations in 
question. Some agreements (for example, Mexico-European Union and Chile-European Union) 
specify more precisely the type of situations that might require them: generally trans-border 
activities or activities with similar effects or the application of measures with extra-territorial 
effects. 
                                                     
23
   In many of these agreements reference is made to “designated” monopolies in the sense that they may 
be established or authorized or their scope may be widened to cover an additional good or service.  
24
 Reference is made to the agreements between Chile and the following: Canada, USA, Central America 
and Mexico; Mexico and the following: Israel and Uruguay; and Panama and the following: Taiwan 
Province of China and Central America. 
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Over half of the agreements establish commitments regarding exchange of information, 
mostly non-confidential, to facilitate the effective application of competition laws. Many contain 
some detail of the sort of suggested information; for example, the application of measures and 
corrective sanctions or monopolies, State enterprises or State grants. Many agreements stipulate 
that information is subject to national rules on confidentiality. Only in rare cases is there 
provision for the submission of confidential information to judicial bodies of the relevant country. 
A considerable number of agreements contain a mechanism for consultations —in one 
case for conflict prevention. In some cases, the consultations are directed at the evaluation of the 
chapter application or the application of cases where important interests of a given country might 
be affected in the territory of another. Some agreements also provide for consultations regarding 
investigations and the effectiveness of measures to counter anti-competitive practices as well as 
the operation, execution, application and interpretation of the chapter. Likewise, some agreements 
call for the favourable and full consideration of the party who receives the consultations. Through 
the consultation mechanism some agreements come close to the principles of positive and 
negative comity, but only in four cases do they include one or both principles with a certain level 
of development. It should be pointed out that consultations can also develop the role of a 
prerequisite or alternative for dispute settlement, which is important when the majority of the 
agreements, explicitly or implicitly, do not include specific mechanisms to deal with 
controversies regarding competition policy. 
The coordination in the application of the law for specific cases appears in four relatively 
recent agreements, which are those of the European Union with Mexico and Chile, and those of 
Chile with EFTA and the Republic of Korea. This is the main cooperation objective between 
competition agencies, which is to establish coordination through independent agreements or as a 
complement to free trade agreements (see table 1). Other coordination areas, especially those that 
go beyond the exchange of information, figure as important components of inter-agency 
agreements. 
Mutual technical cooperation appears in some agreements solely as an item of interest 
and in others as a way to take advantage of the experiences and strengthened competition policy 
and law implementation. In one or two agreements mutual legal assistance is incorporated and 
only the Mexico-EU agreement presents a further level of detail of the type of activities that may 
be involved. It should be pointed out that at a multilateral level this cooperation component is part 
of the special and differential treatment, which caters for huge asymmetries in the area of 
competition institutions. In the presence of such asymmetries, less developed countries face 
challenges in their efforts to close the gap in regulatory development and access to information, 
as well as to obtain resources for the cooperative treatment of cases of international scope.25 
In contrast to some integration agreements that provide for the creation of international 
and other supra-national authorities,26 there are few bilateral agreements that specify any sort of 
institution for dealing with cooperation commitments within the framework of competition policy 
in the agreement. In half of the agreements analysed, the importance of cooperation and 
coordination is recognized —in some more explicitly in regard to the free trade zone— but they 
go into less detail in terms of the practical application of provisions. 
In general terms, the agreements that are more ambitious in terms of the creation of such 
institutions are those signed with the European Union and EFTA, as well as the Costa Rica-
Canada and Chile-Korea agreements. The remainder, many of which follow the NAFTA model, 
pay less attention to cooperation, which explains the subsequent emergence of agreements 
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 Refer to presentations and documents from ECLAC-OAS, 2002. 
26
 Refer to WTO, 1997 and UNCTAD, 2003. 
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between agencies and complementary agreements designed precisely to address this issue. This is 
the case of various agreements or memoranda established by Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica, the 
latter following the Chile-CACM FTA (see table 1). International experience reveals that 
participating countries in these agreements have been harmonizing their approach, and thus, they 
have a greater possibility of legislative convergence. (UNCTAD, 2003: p. 12 and 13). 
6. Dispute Settlement 
In this context, it should be pointed out that the application of a dispute settlement mechanism 
over a possible competition agreement has generated much debate at a multilateral level. The 
discussion and apprehension is due to the diversity of legal and administrative systems that play a 
role in the implementation of competition policy and laws in the countries.27 Peer review and 
consultation has been presented at WTO as one of the alternatives or complementary methods to 
this mechanism (see OECD, 2003). Some of them can also be found at the regional level. 
Half of the bilateral agreements examined make explicit reference to dispute settlement, 
in most cases in order to point out that the chapter on competition or the policies or laws on 
competition will not be subject to the procedures of the agreement. In many NAFTA-type 
agreements, only rules regarding monopolies and State trading enterprises are subject to such 
procedures. In two of these cases, there are explicit references aimed at preventing disputes 
between investors in connection with the chapter on competition. This is the case of the Mexico-
Chile and Mexico-Uruguay FTAs. 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that some other agreements establish more detailed rules 
on consultations and conflict prevention when dealing with situations that affect important 
interests of the partners. These provisions seem to be an alternative—or preparatory— response 
to dispute settlement mechanisms, which comes close to the international experience in European 
Union agreements. 
C. Contents and Models? 
The characterization given in the previous section helps to identify certain “types” or models, of 
cooperation agreements on the basis of their established components and approaches. This section 
proposes to continue along the same lines while at the same time carrying out a cross-cutting 
evaluation in order to integrate and highlight certain common features among the different issues 
covered in the agreements. With some reservations, given the great differences between the 
analyzed agreements, two main types of agreements may be identified, those designed for 
cooperation and those designed to strengthen legislation and its application (with particular 
emphasis on monopolies and State enterprises). A special category consists of those agreements 
with competition chapters that only establish a proposal for strengthening their institutions. 
Seven agreements of the first type (those designed for cooperation) have been identified. 
They include those signed by Chile and Mexico with the European Union and EFTA, with Asian 
countries —Chile-Korea and Mexico-Japan— and the Costa Rica-Canada Agreement. Many of 
these agreements define explicitly the anti-competitive situations to be covered by them and more 
detailed commitments are established for one or more of the cooperation functions examined. 
Normally, such agreements do not include provisions for dispute settlement, and, when they do, it 
is to indicate that the agreement’s mechanisms do not apply to problems that may arise under the 
chapter.  
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 These apprehensions are due to the importance of the system for dispute settlement as a binding 
mechanism on acquired commitments made by participating countries. 
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Some examples of this type of agreement are: 
• Costa Rica and Canada, countries with different levels of development and 
institutions, which included in the chapter on competition of their FTA (2001) a 
framework for the application of their competition laws and policies at a national and 
sub-regional level, as well as for cooperation and coordination between their 
authorities. This agreement sets out explicitly some important principles such as 
transparency, due process and non-discrimination (WTO, 2001b).28 
• Mexico and the European Union, established a cooperation mechanism in the FTA 
signed in 2000, within the framework of their Association Agreement of 1997. This 
mechanism is similar to those described among agencies for the application of laws, 
even though it is part of the aforementioned trade agreement. Membership in the 
OECD was a relevant fact for the elaboration of commitments on competition policy 
in the FTA, since the activities in this body have helped to generate a climate of trust 
and understanding.29 
These agreements, unlike the European Union or ANZCERTA integration agreements, 
do not explicitly seek to harmonize approaches in terms of their market integration objectives. 
However, they go beyond cooperation procedures contained in agreements on application of law, 
while the purpose of the latter is to prevent conflicts and ensure careful consideration of their 
respective vested interests. In the chapters on competition contained in trade agreements, one of 
the main purposes is to ensure that restrictions and distortions placed on competition do not 
diminish the benefits of the agreement or affect trade between the partners.  
On the other hand, agreements of the second type, which give priority to compliance with 
their laws and grant special attention to the operating conditions of monopolies and State 
enterprises, are basically those agreements that follow a NAFTA model. These agreements 
involve one of the countries that are part in that agreement —Mexico with Israel, with Chile and 
with Uruguay; United States-Chile; and Canada-Chile—, also some Central American 
agreements with Chile and with Panama, as well as Panama-Taiwan Province of China. The 
objective is that monopolies and State enterprises should function in accordance with trade 
considerations (even pricing), and in such a way that they do not minimize the benefits of the 
agreements, contradict competition laws or grant discriminatory treatment to investment. 
In order to ensure the fulfilment of the aforementioned conditions, countries are expected 
to establish control or supervision mechanisms. Dispute settlement is not normally applied to the 
fulfilment of domestic laws or policies, as in the case of rules relating to monopolies and State 
enterprises. The importance of cooperation and coordination is recognized for the application of 
the laws in the free trade area, but as a whole these agreements do not establish clear conditions 
and procedures on the subject. Thus, more recently, the signing of specific cooperation 
agreements between competition agencies has complemented some of these agreements. 
The following are a few examples of this type of agreement: 
• Chile and Canada: in 1996, these two parties signed the first agreement between a 
developing country and a country of NAFTA, since the entry into force of the latter 
in 1994. One factor that contributed to the relationship between the partners was their 
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 Also refer to presentation on this experience in ECLAC/OAS, 2002. 
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 This cooperation would recognize coincidences in substantial aspects of national laws and the 
appropriate protection of the rights of those involved in the procedures. The participation of both parties 
in relevant Committees and their adherence to 1995 OECD recommendations contribute to this 
mechanism (Apodaca, 2000). 
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common participation in APEC and FTAA.30 This agreement pledged to eliminate 
antidumping duties in the free trade area and as was mentioned, in 2001, the two 
countries signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the application 
of laws.  
• Chile and United States: these two countries signed one of the more recent and far-
reaching agreements between countries of the region. This agreement involves all 
aspects of bilateral trade relations (DIRECON, 2003). With respect to competition, it 
is more detailed than the Chile-Canada agreement, establishes some principles  
—especially transparency between the Parties— and incorporates consultation 
mechanisms. 
The special category, mentioned at the beginning of this section, contains other 
agreements that basically establish the idea of strengthening the competition systems of the 
countries involved. These were signed at the beginning of the period under analysis (1996) and 
include as parties countries that do not have competition systems (Dominican Republic, Central 
America). The type of commitments established indicates that the signatories shall take steps to 
adopt rules designed to bring anticompetitive actions under control, shall coordinate efforts to 
develop methodological schemes for the treatment of cases or shall move forward towards the 
establishment of common rules.  
Lastly, it may be observed that a single country may establish different types or models 
of agreements, according to the participating partners. This fact tends to corroborate the idea that 
setting up of agreements responds to a number of factors, the most important being the 
characteristics and scope of the trade agreement of which it is part, the level of development of 
the parties, the relative level of maturity of their competition protection system and acquired prior 
experience in signing agreements. The identification of the most significant differences between 
different types of agreements is, on one hand, a learning process for countries that are not yet 
involved in them, and helps them to seek arrangements that best suit their particular interests. 
                                                     
30
 This agreement represented for Chile, in general terms, an opportunity for their negotiating teams to 
acquire a learning process due to the inclusion of disciplines not included in agreements within the 
ALADI framework, such as services, investment and others (Valdes, 1999). It was also an important 
fact for re-negotiating the agreement with Mexico in 1998 (the first was signed in 1991), with a similar 
structure, while including the Trade and Competition Committee with the purpose of studying and 
makes recommendations relating to competition and trade subjects in the free trade area. 
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III. Recapitulation and Prospects for Cooperation 
on Competition Policy 
This paper has shown that since the 1990s, the countries of the region have worked intensively to 
introducing or perfecting competition policies and have participated in relevant international 
negotiations and agreements. The second task called for the definition of cooperation within an 
international framework. Such cooperation may be implemented at various levels: multilateral, 
hemispheric, sub regional or bilateral. There is a high degree of interdependence between these 
areas, as well as a derived cost from the participation in multiple forums and a learning process 
that provides feedback between levels and between different issues covered by these negotiations 
and agreements. 
The bilateral agreements signed in recent years, in which Mexico and Chile have been 
leading figures, are further examples of the intensive efforts by countries of the region to 
conclude trade agreements that address the issue of competition. 
An important point to note in this dynamic task is the heterogeneity of participating 
countries in terms of size, level of development or maturity of their competition systems; indeed, 
some participating countries do not even have competition laws or institutions. Nevertheless, in 
terms of competition policy, those countries with less development in a number of dimensions did 
not seem to benefit from any special and differential treatment (SDT).31 Beyond the willingness 
of the countries themselves, this is a very difficult issue to deal with in coordinating competition 
policy, as has been seen in discussions on this issue in the FTAA and WTO (Silva, 2003).32 Thus, 
the pertinence of SDT is open for discussion as well as the relevance of having longer periods or 
more flexible prerequisites for these countries to take part in such agreements. In this regard, the 
experience of economic partnership agreements (EPA), which introduce important cooperation 
commitments are interesting with respect to parties that show great disparities. 
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 The absence of SDT is also noted in a review carried out by the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA), 2003. 
32
 In a general manner, SDT, as traditionally conceived, requires major innovations in agreements that 
contain provisions on domestic policy, which require institutional efforts in developing countries. 
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Another point is that one country may adopt different models for competition 
coordination, depending on its partners in the agreement. This has to do with the characteristics of 
the agreements as well as of the countries taking part. Clearly, some of these agreements have a 
more important cooperation component because the agreement itself develops within this type of 
commitment, in accordance with the objectives or the role that each party has in its international 
integration strategy. Some of this can be seen through complementary agreements between 
agencies that have appeared a few years after the signing of an FTA, whose chapter on 
competition only deals with cooperation in a limited way. Thus, it will be important to observe 
how coordination efforts evolve over time, given that many of these agreements are too recent for 
this exercise to be undertaken.  
In order to pursue the analysis presented in this paper, future studies could consider 
regional experiences in light of the progress in bilateral cooperation at the international level. 
Based on the cases under consideration, these studies could be two-fold: on the one hand, to 
consider cooperation agreements —among agencies— for the application of laws; on the other, to 
consider trade agreements with rules regarding competition policy. Cooperation agreements can 
be studied basically in relation to already existing experience in developed nations.33 On the other 
hand, the study of trade agreements should focus on those areas linked to competition dealt with 
in other chapters of the agreements, that is, it should involve a more comprehensive approach to 
the agreements.34 
Some of these international experiences reveal that bilateral agreements for cooperation 
regarding competition have limitations, costs and benefits.35 In terms of the limitations, it will be 
noted that this type of agreement is insufficient for facing up to the challenges of globalization, 
which implies a greater number of interdependencies that exist at a bilateral level. Until now, it 
has also been observed that bilateral agreements are effective between large countries because of 
the need for reciprocity and levelling of interests. In terms of costs, there should be a 
differentiation between negotiation and administration; in addition, there is a growing need for 
resources to implement cooperation, respond to requests and handle manage notifications and 
consultations. At advanced stages of the investigation process, it may also be difficult to 
coordinate enforcement measures. 
Nevertheless, one of the main benefits of these agreements is their effect on capacity 
building and probably on the competition culture, especially when developing countries establish 
cooperation with more developed ones. They also establish a legal framework for cooperation and 
promote closer relations. There is also a potential learning process in the prevention of disputes 
and settlement of those that may arise as a result of transnational activities and may facilitate 
analytical convergence. These benefits can be obtained with greater ease and in less time than that 
required in a plurilateral or multilateral agreement.36 In addition, the coordination exercise 
regarding competition potentially represents greater bargaining power, in sub regional, 
plurilateral or multilateral agreements. 
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 See UNCTAD, 2003a; WTO, 1997 and 2002; and OECD, 2002. 
34
 For this purpose, one could refer to agreements between countries of similar development —for 
example, members of ANZCERTA— or those countries with different levels of development, for 
example, between the European Union and neighbouring countries, the EPA negotiated by Japan and 
other Asian countries, and some recent agreements between the United States and countries outside the 
region. With the exception of the agreements considered in this paper, and the Singapore agreement, the 
United States has not incorporated competition chapters in agreements with other developing countries 
(see USTR web site). 
35
 Much of this analysis is developed around agreements between agencies (see Balzarotti, 2000; OECD, 
2002; United States, 1997 and 2002; Jenny, 2000). 
36
 This is reflected in the lack of results in Cancun and the subsequent discussions within the WTO. 
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On a different note, it will be recalled that the discussions and negotiations at higher 
levels also contribute to the generation of bilateral agreements and capacity-building in countries 
that are just beginning to develop a competition policy. Reference was made in the previous 
section to the main forums, such as OECD and UNCTAD.37 Nevertheless, there have also been 
contributions in terms of concepts and principles from bodies such as APEC, FTAA and WTO, in 
addition to progress in transparency and learning from common experiences and cooperation for 
institution-building that they normally incorporate. 
The participation of countries of the region in a large number of bilateral trade 
agreements, including the competition policy component should not mask the potential costs and 
benefits referred to earlier. The heterogeneity of these countries poses an additional challenge in 
terms of harmonization. Moreover, there is the risk that the coordination of competition policy 
with other policy elements contained in these agreements, might discriminate against third 
countries.38 
Lastly, the incorporation of competition policy in sub regional or integration agreements 
has had some impact in terms of strengthening national policies, however, the subregional level 
has been held back in the last years. Instead, this process has continued through bilateral 
cooperation agreements, which could help to form or strengthen the culture of competition in a 
more general sense. Moreover, it should come as no surprise that countries participating in such 
agreements should move forward in one way or another towards harmonization of their 
approaches and practices, thus, maximizing the possibilities of joining forces for the negotiation 
of more comprehensive agreements (FTAA and WTO). 
 
 
                                                     
37
 Special reference is made to OECD recommendations on cooperation as well as to the efforts by 
UNCTAD to come up with a cooperation model. See also Vaira and Riviere, 1998. 
38
 For example, in the case of substituting antidumping rules for competition policy, that would affect 
third countries quite differently (Heydon, 2002). 
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OMC: www.wto.org    SELA: http://sela2.sela.org/WM2/WM10.ASP 
SIECA: http://www.sieca.org.gt/  
UNCTAD: http://www.unctad.org/               (Política de competencia: www.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy) 
Unión Europea (UE) y Comisión Europea: http://www.europa.eu.int/  
        (Política de competencia: http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/comp/) 
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Bilateral Trade Agreements of LAC Countries that Contain a 
Chapter on Competition Policy 
TABLE 1 
LIST OF AGREEMENTS 
(chronological order) 




 TYPE OF AGREEMENT 
AND COMPETITION 
REFERENCES 
1996 - 1996 1. Chile – MERCOSUR  ECA/LAIA No. 35, Title VI 
1996 – 1997 2. Chile – Canada FTA, Chapter J. 
1998 - 1999 3. Chile – Mexico FTA, Chapter 14 
1998 – 2001/2 4. Central America – Dominican R. FTA, Chapter XV 
1999 – 2002 5. Chile – CACM FTA, Chapter 15 
2000 – 2001 6. Mexico – EFTA FTA, Chapter IV 
2000 – 2000 7. Mexico – Israel FTA, Chapter VIII 
2000 - 2000 8. Mexico – EU FTA, Títle IVa 
2001 - 2002 9. Costa Rica – Canada  FTA, Chapter XI 
2002 -  10. Central America – Panama  FTA, Chapter 15 
2003 – 2003 11. Chile – EU FTA, Títle VII 
2003 – 2004 12. Chile – USA FTA, Chapter 16 
2003 -  13. Chile – EFTA FTA, Chapter VI 
2003 - 2004 14. Chile –Republic of Korea  FTA, Chapter 15 
2003 - 2004 15. Panama – Taiwan Prov. of 
China 
FTA, Chapter 15 
2003 -  16. Mexico - Uruguay FTA, Chapter XIV 
2004 -  17. CARICOM – Costa Rica  FTA, Chapter XIV 
2004 18. Mexico – Japanb  FTA, Chapter 12 and 
Implementation Agreement 
Source: Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Inventario de los acuerdos, tratados y otros arreglos sobre 
políticas de competencia existentes en el hemisferio occidental (FTAA.ngpc/inf/03/Rev.2), 22 March 2002; 
official web site of Foreign Trade Information Service, Organization of American States (SICE-OAS) and web 
sites of national bodies dealing with competition or negotiations.  
Notes: (a) Corresponds to Article 39 of Decision Nr. 2, year 2000 of the joint Council; and developed in annex 
XV. The content is on Article 11 of Global Association Agreement.  
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TABLE 2 
MAP OF AGREEMENTS  
(date of signing) 
SIGNATORY 
COUNTRIES/BLOCS  




CARICOM  C.Rica 2004      
Central America C. Rica 2004  1999   2001 1998 
Chile  1999  1996 1998   
MERCOSUR   1996  Uruguay 2003   
Mexico   1998 Uruguay 2003    
Panama  2001      
Dominican Republic  1998      
OUTSIDE THE REGION 
Canada  C. Rica 2001 1996  a)   
EFTA   2003  2000   
European Union   2002  2000   
Israel     2000   
Japan     2004   
Republic of Korea   2003     
Taiwan Prov. of China      2003  
USA   2003  a)   
TOTAL  1 5 8 2 6 2 1 
Source: Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Inventario de los acuerdos, tratados y otros arreglos sobre 
políticas de competencia existentes en el hemisferio occidental (FTAA.ngpc/inf/03/Rev.2), 22 March 2002; official 
web site of Foreign Trade Information Service, Organization of American States (SICE-OAS) and web sites of 
national bodies dealing with competition or negotiations.  













































































































CHAPTERS ON COMPETITION POLICY IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 1996-2004: MAIN COMPONENTSa 
(In chronological order, based on the year of signing of the agreements) 
Agreements 





































O B J E C T I V E S  
-G e n e r a l :                   
To ensure that the benefits of 
this Agreement are not 
impaired by anticompetitive 
trade practices.  
                           
To devise measures for 
application of the law which 
help to promote the 
objectives of the Agreement. 
                           
 
  
-S p e c i f i c s c                    
To develop competition 
policies in the free trade zone 
and seek common provisions  
                       
To promote the effective 
application of rules on free 
competition within the free 
trade area. 
                    
 
 
To promote cooperation and 
coordination among the 
Parties for the application  of 
their laws.  
                         
 
  
P R I N C I P L E S  A N D  I N S T I T U T I O N A L  F R A M E W O R K d   
Non-discriminatory measures 
and application  
         
        
    
  
Equitable procedures for 
dealing with anti-competitive 
activitiese  




    
  
Transparency: Public 
availability of measures and  
justification for dealing with 
anticompetitive activities  
        
           
   
  
Adopt principles acceptable 
to the Parties in multilateral 
forums (e.g. WTO)  
  
 





















































































































































Establishment of a 
competition (and trade) body 
or officialsf 
  
       
 
  
      
  
   
With tasks such as the 
following: 
-Apply the provisions 
contained in the chapter  
  
     
 
  
    
  
     
-Ensure that consultations or 
other cooperation tasks are 
dealt with.  
        
  
   
    
    
COVERAGE 
Identification of 
anticompetitive practicesg  








    
-Exclusions and 
authorizations:h Non-
supervision of government 
agencies that acquire goods 















MONOPOLIES AND STATE ENTERPRISESi 
The designation of 
monopolies or State 
enterprises is not prohibited 








      
 
      
  
Efforts to introduce conditions 
that minimize the cancellation 
or reduction of benefits  
 
    
   
  
  




Notification, when the 
designation may affect the 




   
  
  




Supervision: ensure that 
monopolies and State 
enterprises do not conduct 
activities incompatibles with 
the commitments undertaken 














Other specific requirements:k 




   
  
    
  
   
  
  
-In developing the trade 
function, grant non-

















































































































































discriminatory treatment to 
the other Party’s investment 
and goods and services  
-Subject to competition rulesl                             
COOPERATION AND COORDINATIONm 
Importance of cooperation 
and coordination in the 
application of the law for the 








Notification of activities for 
application of the law if its 
action can affect the other 
Partyn 
     
                   
  
  
-Specify situations that 
require notificationñ  
     
           
    
  
Exchange of non-confidential 
information,o: in order to 
facilitate the effective 




                    
  
  
-Type of information: 
sanctions or corrective 
measures and their rationale, 
application processes etc. 
     
             
    
-Subject to rules of 
“confidentiality” applicable in 
each Party  
     
                   
 
  
-Submission of confidential 
information to the courts of 
justice in the respective 
country subject to 
confidentiality 
          
       
   
  
Consultationsp when the 
important interests of one 
Party are adversely affected 
in the territory of the other 
Party  
     
                
 
  
-With respect to the 
operation, execution, 
application and interpretation 
of the Chapter, or measures 




               
  

















































































































































the submissions or opinions 
by the receiving authority  
-Principles of positive and/or 
negative comityq 
     
               
 
  
Coordination in applying the 
law  in specific cases does 
not prevent taking decisions 
independently.  
       
           
   
  
Mutual technical cooperation 
for using experiences and 
reinforcing implementation of 




   




geared towards the 
objectives of the Chapter 
may be made for the future  
             
      
  
 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTESr 
-Inability to resort to the 
Agreement’s system for 
settling disputes for matters 
arising under the Chapter. 
 
                 
    
-Id. The above with respect to 
competition legislation and 
policiess 
 





















nts, it is indicated in the note. The dates and identification of chapters in 
each agreement are shown in Annex 2;  
(b) The issues have been defined in this annex for analytical purposes, so that they do not necessarily correspond to the titles of sections in the agreements under consideration. In 
addition, the regulatory contents presented sum up basic ideas in the texts of the agreements, that is, they do not reproduce exactly the expressions contained therein;  
(c) The purpose of establishing consumer protection rules is specified only in the case of Chile-MERCOSUR; 
(d) The agreements between Chile and the United States and Chile and the Republic of Korea stipulate that autonomy shall not be infringed in policy definition or implementation;  











































































































(f) The Chile-Mexico and Mexico-Uruguay agreements provide that officials shall report and make recommendations on trade and competition to treaty bodies. The agreements of 
Costa Rica-Canada and Chile-United States provide for the establishment of an impartial and independent competition authority responsible for applying the law; 
(g) These practices include agreements/practices concluded between firms, abuse of dominant position, concentrations, mergers and acquisitions. In the case of Mexico-Israel, 
there is the possibility of adopting agreements for restricting competition subject to notification and minimization of effects that diminish competition; 
(h) In the case of Costa Rica-Canada, it is specified that the exclusions must be transparent and are subject to a periodic assessment of their functionality in terms of general policy 
goals; 
(i) Also enterprises that hold exclusive rights (cases of Chile-Korea and Chile-EFTA)  
(j) Some agreements specify that supervision may take the form of regulatory control, administrative supervision or other mechanisms;  
(k) The Chile-EFTA agreement also indicates that it is subject to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (A.XVII: State trading enterprises) and to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (A.VIII: Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers);  
(l) In some cases, it is agreed that a monopoly position will not be used to carry out anticompetitive practices (or practices which have an adverse effect on the investment of the 
other Party); 
(m) In some of the cases referred to, the notification, consultations and exchange of information do not carry qualifications or operating details;  







(ñ) Transborder activities with extraterritorial impact or measures. The Mexico-European Union agreement also includes other government measures with effects on competition; 
(o) The Mexico-European Union agreement includes: mutual assistance for compiling information on their respective territories and the promotion of knowledge on their 
respective competition laws and policies. In the case of the Mexico-Japan Agreement, rules on confidential information are established. The Chile-European Union and Chile-
United States agreements contemplate the provision of information requested on application, monopolies and State enterprises, State aid, exceptions (at any government level);  
(p) Consultations may refer to anticompetitive practices or investigation processes. The Mexico-European Union agreement refers to the consideration of important interests of the 
other Party in the application of the law and the search for mutually acceptable solutions as “dispute prevention”;  
(q) In some unspecified cases, reference is only made to consultations relating to the consideration of interests or the situation affecting the applicant country. The Mexico-EFTA 
agreement specifies that applications must be very specific and subjected to careful consideration;  
(r) The Mexico-European Union agreement specifies the type of activities that may be included, for example, seminars, training, joint studies, facilitating access to information;  
(s) The Costa Rica-Canada agreement provides for the referral of consultations, when there is no mutually satisfactory solution (see also “consultations”). The Chile-Mexico and 
Mexico-Uruguay agreements prohibit the submission of a dispute by an investor on any issue relating to competition legislation;  
(t) In most of these cases, it may be inferred that provisions relating to monopolies and State enterprises would be subject to dispute settlement. 
